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Environmental Initiatives and Earnings Management
Abstract
Purpose  The purpose of this paper is to provide initial evidence on the association between
environmental initiatives and earnings management.
Prior literature documents firms
participating in environmental initiatives to report relatively stronger financial performance.
Moreover, firms with superior performance have been shown to engage in greater levels of
earnings management. A natural question that arises is: to what extent do firms with
environmental initiatives engage in earnings management to report better financial performance?
Design/methodology/approach  The study draws on two theoretical frameworks, external
monitoring and internal corporate culture, to predict an inverse association between
environmental initiatives and earnings management. We test this prediction using an earnings
management regression model, estimating discretionary accruals using the modifiedJones
approach.
Findings – The study finds that firms with environmental initiatives exhibit lower earnings
management proxied by absolute and incomeincreasing total discretionary accruals. We further
find pollution prevention and climate related initiatives to help explain this inverse association.
Our results imply that firms practicing environmental responsibility report better financial
performance most likely due to real economic performance rather than through earnings
management techniques.
Originality/value  This study provides initial evidence on the association between
environmental initiatives and earnings management, an area of tremendous value to all
stakeholders in a market with increasing interest in corporate environmental performance and its
implications.
Keywords  corporate social responsibility, climate, environmental performance, earnings
management, earnings quality
Paper type – Research paper
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Environmental Initiatives and Earnings Management
1. Introduction
Corporate social and environmental responsibility is receiving increasing attention from
regulators, market participants, the public, and the media (Social Investment Forum, 2012).
Initiatives related to the environment are a component of the broader concept of corporate social
responsibility (CSR) that is receiving more intense scrutiny, a trend that is certainly expected to
continue given recent corporate environmental disasters such as the British Petroleum oil spill.1
To enhance accountability and transparency, and assist capital market participants in making
more informed economic decisions, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently
released its environmental disclosure transparency initiatives (SEC, 2010).2 Such disclosure
initiatives underscore the unprecedented growth in socially and environmentally responsible
investments over the past twenty years.3 To hedge risks, shareholders are also demanding

CSR encompasses an array of activities that can impact various aspects of our world, such as environmental
activities, labor relations, diversity, employee protection, sale of toxic substances such as alcohol and tobacco, and
activities involving nuclear products. These various CSR activities have been categorized according to their positive
and negative impact on society and the environment. Authors in the literature use terms such as CSR and corporate
social performance synonymously. We restrict our study to the environmental component of CSR and deeply
analyze the environmental dimension by examining how its various components are related to earnings
management.
1

This SEC interpretive release entitled Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change
more thoroughly outlines an organization’s responsibility to disclose existing and potential climate change effects on
annual report items such as the description of business, risk factors, environmental capital expenditures, and legal
and regulatory disclosures. Compliance with this guideline is currently not mandatory although the SEC is
considering introducing some mandatory disclosure requirements.
2

3

Investments in these funds grew from $639 billion to $3.74 trillion between 1995 and 2012 (Social Investment

Forum, 2012). Organizations providing such mutual funds include Ariel Funds, Pax World Balanced Funds, New
Alternatives Funds, and Green Century Funds; and indices include the KLD Index under the RiskMetrics Group
(now a part of the MSCI ESG Database) and the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.
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executives and boards to terminate their relationships with companies presenting high
environmental risk (Allen et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, some investors have suffered significant economic losses following
scandals at environmentally responsible firms. Bohn (2010) documents anecdotes of fraudulent
reporting and intentional abuse of millions of dollars invested in firms headed by high profile
executives advertising socially responsible environmental initiatives.4 Such evidence counters
the general notion that executives and the governance of environmentally responsible firms are
of relatively higher standards (VanDyne et al., 1994; Fombrum et al., 2000).
A potential explanation for such unexpected economic consequences is that market
participants believe environmentally responsible firms are an attractive investment based on the
growth and performance of such firms (Social Investment Forum, 2012).

Capital market

research affirms such beliefs by documenting a positive association between environmental
initiatives and firm performance (e.g., Bragdon and Marlin, 1972; Spicer, 1978; Douglas and
Judge, 1995; Semenova and Hassel, 2008; Guenster et al., 2011; Eccles et al., 2012).
However, we know from the extant literature that firms use earnings management
techniques to meet market expectations and portray financial strength that may not reflect
economic reality (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Payne and Robb, 2000; Dechow et al., 2000;
Matsumoto, 2002; Das and Zhang, 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Lin et al., 2008). Given
the increasing attention and investments poured into environmentally responsible firms, it is
important to empirically ascertain if these firms are engaged in relatively greater earnings
Bohn specifically cites one recent highprofile case involved the Mantria Corporation in which the company
claimed to be developing environmentallyfriendly residential communities and fuel sources, but then faced a
complaint filed by the SEC in November 2009 that alleged Mantria to be a Ponzi scheme that scammed
approximately 300 investors out of $30 million through fraudulent and unregistered securities offerings (Bohn,
2010).
4
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management. The evidence from such analyses could infer whether the relatively better financial
performance of firms engaged in environmental initiatives is achieved through management’s
manipulations of earnings or real economic performance.5 By doing so, this study contributes to
the literature and practice by providing initial insight on the association between environmental
initiatives and earnings management.
Recent studies have examined earnings management in the more broad context of CSR
activities and have yielded conflicting results (Trebucq and Russ, 2005; Petrovits, 2006; Chih et
al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Kim et al., 2012). For example,
Petrovits (2006) and Prior et al (2008) find evidence of greater earnings management associated
with CSR activities for firms reporting small earnings increases and unregulated firms,
respectively. However, Trebucq and Russ (2005) and Chih et al. (2008) find inconsistent results
in this area based on different CSR and earnings management specifications. And Kim et al.
(2012) find that CSR is negatively related to discretionary accruals. One explanation of these
conflicting results is that a broad measure of CSR comprised of several categories and sub
categories may mask specific associations between different types of CSR activities and earnings
management. Thus, we extend this limited but growing literature by focusing on environmental
initiatives and how their various components relate to earnings management. Prior studies have
not examined how the components of environmental initiatives are related to earnings
management.
We hypothesize that firms engaged in environmental initiatives are associated with less
earnings management based on both an external monitoring theory and an internal corporate
We assume that if environmental initiatives are not significantly positively associated with earnings management,
but are rather significantly negatively associated with earnings management, then it is likely that such firms derive
their relatively better financial performance through real economic gains rather than earnings management practices.
5
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culture theory. The former suggests that since environmentally responsible firms are more
closely monitored and followed by regulators, investors, society, and the media, management of
such firms will perceive greater scrutiny and compliance pressure. Together, these sentiments
may motivate management of environmentally responsible firms not to pursue questionable
financial reporting practices as the consequences of doing so may harm their reputation and
heighten the risk of litigation. Extant literature supports this notion of increased monitoring
driving higher reported earnings quality or lower earnings management (Defond and Jiambalvo,
1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1997; Becker et al., 1998; Mitra, 2002;
Knayazvena, 2007; Yu, 2008).
The internal corporate culture theory suggests that firms with environmental initiatives
foster a corporate culture exhibiting moral beliefs and values for the greater good, and happier,
more productive, and more honest employees. Consequently, such corporate cultures encourage
employees to act less out of selfinterest, and in our context, potentially reduce the propensity for
earnings manipulation. This line of reasoning is grounded in research presenting evidence of
better CSR breeding stronger corporate culture (Etzioni, 1988; Tichy et al., 1997; Sherman,
1997; Turban and Greening, 1997; Leonard, 1997; Maignan et al., 1999; Maignan and Ferrell,
2001), which fosters corporate commitment and reduces employee selfinterest behavior
(VanDyne et al., 1994; Fombrum et al., 2000). Based on these two theoretical frameworks, we
predict an inverse association between firms engaged in environmental initiatives and earnings
management.
Based on a sample of 2,095 firm observations from 2004 to 2006 and after controlling for
determinants of earnings management, we find support for the predicted negative association
between environmental initiatives and earnings management proxied by total discretionary
5
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accruals estimated using the performanceadjusted modifiedJones model (Kothari et al., 2005).
Our results are consistent across total and incomeincreasing measures of discretionary accruals.
We also find that discretionary accruals are most significantly negatively related to initiatives
related to pollution prevention and climate protection. Our results are robust to a number of
additional tests, including partitioning by firm size, environmentally sensitive industries, and
financial performance, and the inclusion of potential omitted variables.
Overall, our initial results support the assertion that firms engaged in environmental
initiatives exhibit lower earnings management.

This finding supports the notion that the

relatively superior financial performance exhibited by environmentallyresponsible firms is not
likely a result of earnings manipulation but more likely due to real economic gains. Moreover,
our results suggest that firms engaged in pollution prevention and/or climate protection
initiatives are least likely to manage earnings. The evidence presented is consistent with the
external monitoring and internal corporate culture theoretical frameworks drawn upon to
predicate our hypothesis. These findings add insight to the literature and suggest areas of future
research to advance our understanding of the implications of environmental initiatives. Our
findings also inform capital markets and regulators by documenting that environmentally
responsible firms are generally less likely to misreport financial information. Such findings
could also assist auditors screening for firms that are more likely to misstate their earnings.
The remainder of this paper progresses as follows. The next section reviews extant
literature. Section 3 provides a development of our hypothesis. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the
sample and empirical model, respectively. Section 6 presents our primary results, and Section 7
reports the results of additional analyses. Lastly, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Prior Literature
6
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We review two areas of pertinent literature underpinning our primary research question. We first
review studies that examine the association between firm environmental and financial
performance. This review establishes the link between environmental initiatives and financial
measures of firm success. The second literary area we review provides anecdotal and empirical
support of the association between earnings management and firm financial performance. A
review of this literature suggests that positive financial performance measures are sometimes
achieved through devious earnings management means.

Deductively, these two literary

paradigms lead to our research question that examines the extent to which firms with
environmental initiatives manage earnings.
2.1 Environmental Performance and Financial Performance
Although research in the U.S. has not historically examined corporate environmental
performance as rigorously as in other developed nations, the existing studies do support an
association between environmental and financial performance.6 As early as 1972, a positive
association between environmental performance and financial performance was supported for
U.S. firms in the pulp and paper industry (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972). This study along with
Spicer’s (1978) empirical archival results support the notion that firms with better environmental
pollutioncontrol devices tend to be more profitable. Additionally, due to lack of publicly
available environmental initiative data, Douglas and Judge (1995) utilize a survey questionnaire
administered to U.S. managers and find that firms with greater natural environment resource
commitments exhibit superior environmental and financial performance. This research lays the

Refer to Balabanis et al. (1998), Cronin (2001), and Hill et al. (2007) for a review of selected studies in other
countries.
6
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foundation for the positive association between environmental performance and financial
performance of U.S. firms.
In the more recent empirical archival studies, firm environmental preparedness and
performance are significant and positively associated with accountingbased operational and
financial performance measures, such as return on assets and Tobin’s q (Semenova and Hassel,
2008; Guenster et al., 2011). Other studies have shown green capital, green marketing, and other
environmental efficiencies to give firms significant competitive advantage in their operations and
financial results (Orsato, 2006; Chen, 2008; FrajAndres et al., 2009). And most recently, Eccles
et al. (2012) find that companies with a higher sustainability focus significantly outperform their
counterparts in both stock market and accounting longterm performance metrics. Collectively,
these studies support a positive link between environmental initiatives and financial
performance, establishing the first premise underpinning our research hypothesis.
2.2 Earnings Management and Financial Performance
The prevalence of corporate financial scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s highlighted the
harsh reality that strong financial performance is not always a result of true economic
performance; rather they suggest that financial performance can be manipulated by management
to appear better than the economic reality of the firm. High profile companies such as Enron,
Tyco, WorldCom, and Xerox, who commanded financial respect by appearing to perform so well
financially, were uncovered to have engaged in earnings manipulation to produce their strong
financial results. For Xerox, April 2002 revealed a massive multiyear manipulation that the
SEC claims kept Xerox’s stock price artificially high in the late 1990s, evidence of the manner in
which investors and the financial world at large were misled (Bandler and Hechinger, 2002).

8
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Empirical research has similarly supported the association between earnings management
and the appearance of strong financial performance. Given the importance the market places on
meeting analyst forecasts, we review literature that has examined earnings management as a tool
for achieving forecast targets, thereby presenting positive financial performance to the market.
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence of management’s use of discretionary accruals
to avoid losses or earnings declines. Additionally, Dechow et al. (2000), Payne and Robb
(2000), and Das and Zhang (2003) show that managers use discretionary accruals to meet or beat
analysts’ forecasts.

Similarly, Matsumoto (2002) presents a positive association between

incomeincreasing discretionary accruals and the likelihood of avoiding negative earnings
surprise. In another interesting finding, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that abnormal
accruals are the main source of asymmetry in the distribution of forecast errors, indicating the
use of accruals to meet analyst expectations in current and future periods. And although recent
research has brought to light other forms of financial statement manipulation, Lin et al. (2008)
still find evidence of firms’ heavy use of abnormal accruals to achieve analyst expectations.
These empirical archival studies consistently support the notion that positive financial
performance may not always be derived from real economic substance but from earnings
management, thus supporting the second premise underpinning our research hypothesis.
3. Hypothesis Development
3.1 Environmental Initiatives and External Monitoring
Corporate environmental responsibility has received considerably more attention in recent years.
Increasing societal pressures, media attention, and capital market interest paid to environmental
issues all contribute to an overall greater visibility of environmentally active firms by regulators
and the market alike. For example, Congress and corporate regulators such as the Securities and
9
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Exchange Commission (SEC) have increased their focus on corporate environmental
responsibility through increased regulatory scrutiny, evidenced by such guidelines as the recent
environmental disclosure rules set forth to increase corporate America's accountability to
stakeholders (SEC, 2010). Such increased regulatory attention complements the rising interest in
social and environmental responsibility on behalf of capital markets. The past twenty years has
seen unprecedented growth in socially responsible mutual funds and market indices, with
investments growing exponentially from $639 billion to $3.74 trillion between 1995 and 2012
(Social Investment Forum, 2012). Shareholders are even going so far as to demand companies
terminate relationships with companies presenting high environmental risk (Allen et al., 2010).
With public concern serving as a considerable driver of corporate environmentalism (Banerjee et
al., 2003), firms are paying closer attention to the way they implement and report their
environmental performance. Considering this monumental increase in societal, regulatory, and
market coverage of environmentally responsible firms, we anticipate that firms will strive to
provide high quality financial reporting in order to meet the increasing demand for such quality
that comes along with rising levels of public scrutiny.
Extant literature supports this notion of better earnings quality with an increased level of
market attention. In the most recent of these studies, Knyazeva (2007) reports a negative
association between analyst coverage, a proxy for market scrutiny, and earnings management,
arguing that greater market coverage of firms serves as a partial substitute to other governance
mechanisms in constraining earnings manipulation. Yu (2008) also finds a significant negative
association between analyst coverage and the level of firm discretionary accruals, and the
likelihood to just meeting or beating earnings benchmarks. This research paradigm supports our

10
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argument that greater market visibility of environmentally responsible firms would likely
dampen the extent of earnings manipulation by such firms.
Another external source of monitoring comes from institutional owners.

Because

institutional owners have greater resources, ability, and incentives to monitor firms in which they
invest, they may serve as a monitoring mechanism to deter earnings management (Mitra, 2002).
As previously discussed, environmentally active firms have seen a massive influx of attention
from mutual funds, market indices, and the market alike, undoubtedly increasing these firms’
attractiveness to more sophisticated institutional investors. In fact, by 2001, the amount of
money invested in professionally managed, socially screened equities passed the $2.03 trillion
mark, with one of out of every eight institutional investment dollars being part of a socially
responsible portfolio (Social Investment Forum, 2001). Prior research on institutional ownership
has reported similar results to the analyst coverage literature with regard to the effect of
increased market attention on earnings management. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) and Becker
et al. (1998) find less prior period incomedecreasing adjustments with the presence of
blockholder ownership. Dechow et al. (1996) report that firms with blockholders are less likely
to commit financial statement fraud. Perhaps most relevantly, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam
(1997) find institutional ownership to be negatively related to the absolute value of discretionary
accruals, consistent with institutional owners’ role as monitors of earnings quality. These studies
complement the analyst coverage literature in establishing our theoretical conjecture that firms
participating in environmental initiatives are less likely to manage earnings due to the heightened
external market forces closely monitoring such firms.
3.2 Environmental Initiatives and Internal Corporate Culture
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Firm involvement in CSR initiatives have been shown not only to impact financial performance,
but also to impact corporate culture (Tichy et al., 1997). CSR helps integrate a firm into local
community social networks, strengthening bonds between the company, its employees, and the
community (Etzioni, 1988). Walter Haas, Jr., Chairman of LeviStrauss, a company highly
involved in social and environmental initiatives, verbalized this notion during an interview with
Fortune Magazine in saying, “I believe that if you can create an environment that your people
identify with, that is responsive to their sense of values, justice, fairness, ethics, compassion, and
appreciation, they will help you be successful” (Sherman, 1997, 104).
Extant empirical research directly supports the influence of CSR in creating and
maintaining happy and productive employees. Firms involved in CSR are more attractive to
potential employees (Turban and Greening, 1997), and also experience higher employee
commitment thereafter (Maignan et al., 1999; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001).. Additionally, a
survey of executives conducted by the Conference Board shows that employee productivity,
morale, team work, and skill development improve significantly when corporate social initiatives
are implemented (Leonard, 1997). More recently, Lindgreen et al. (2009) report results of a CSR
survey administered to 401 U.S. firms, which echo the findings of prior research and show that
CSR initiatives motivate employees and bond them to the company.
Strong corporate cultures, such as those provided by socially and environmentally
responsible firms, are less likely to experience selfinterest employee behavior that conflicts with
firm objectives due to the close alignment between the individual employee’s selfinterest and
the collective good of the company and society (Fombrun et al., 2000). Additionally, firms with
a greater sustainability focus tend to be more longterm oriented, disclose more nonfinancial
information, and incentivize directors and executives more on sustainability measures (Eccles et
12
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al., 2012). This greater transparency and lesser emphasis on financial incentive measures may
contribute to a culture less conducive to earnings manipulation. CSR initiatives themselves also
foster altruism and dampen individualistic thinking, thereby lessening the risk of purely self
interested behavior (Van Dyne et al., 1994). Given that environmental initiatives are a major
subset of CSR initiatives, extending this line of reasoning to financial reporting practices
suggests that firms engaging in environmental initiatives have a corporate culture that would
likely not condone manipulation of earnings to artificially boost earnings.
In summary, the preceding discussion of the two theoretical frameworks, external
monitoring and internal corporate culture, together suggest that earnings management would be
lower for firms with environmental initiatives. We, therefore propose the following directional
hypothesis:
H: There is an inverse association between environmental initiatives and earnings
management.
4. Sample
We identify firms with environmental data using the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. database.7
KLD independently rates companies trading on U.S. stock exchanges with regard to their social
performance across a range of dimensions, including the environment (KLD, 2006).8 The KLD
database is widely used and considered highly reliable because the KLD analysts are
independent of the companies being rated, the analysts use objective screening criteria to rate
firms, the ratings are applied consistently across companies, and a wide range of sources is used
We note that since the time of our study, this database is now a part of the MSCI ESG database; however, we refer
to it as KLD herein as this was the database during our period of study.
7

Other dimensions of social performance data in KLD include community, diversity, employee relations, and
human rights (KLD, 2006).
8
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to obtain the data (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001).9 This database,
containing firm data as far back as 1991, has been increasingly used in the past several years in
management and accounting research (e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Bartkus and Glassman, 2008;
Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Chen et al., 2008, Cho et al., 2009).
We begin our data year in 2004 since KLD restructured some of its data in prior years
thus affecting comparability. The environmental initiative data is sourced from KLD, financial
data from COMPUSTAT, and governance data from the Corporate Library. Our initial sample,
derived from converging these three databases and removing companies with missing data,
comprises 3,697 firm observations in calendar years 20042006.10 We then exclude financial
firms based on twodigit standard industry classification (SIC = 60 to 69) and remove
observations without a December 31 yearend as KLD gathers and codes environmental data on
a calendaryear basis. Our final sample comprises 2,095 firm observations with all the necessary
data.

While our sample attrition rate may seem high, it is similar to other studies (e.g.,

DeVilliers et al., 2011) utilizing the three databases we do as well.
5. Empirical Model and Variables
We construct the following earnings management model based on the prior literature and
variables described below:

KLD indicated through our discussions that most of the environmental data are sourced from a firm’s proxy
statements such as the 10K.
9

We end our sample in 2006 to avoid the impact of the period surrounding the financial crisis on
our results. It is plausible that in the year prior to the crisis, firms may have indulged in greater
environmental activities but during and following the crisis, reduced their investment in
environmental activities. Similarly, firms may have altered their earnings management behavior
during this period as regulators applied more scrutiny on corporate behavior.
10
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DACC = f { LN_MVE , LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY, ENV }
5.1 Dependent Variable: Discretionary Accruals (DACC)
We use total discretionary accruals for our measure of earnings management for the following
reasons.

First, it is widely used and has been validated as a reliable proxy for earnings

management (Kothari et al., 2005). Second, it is a more appropriate measure for our study
because many environmental initiatives require significant resources that result in material
capital expenditures. Capital expenditures are usually reported as long term assets, particularly,
property, plant and equipment (PPE), which is captured in the total discretionary accruals model.
Working capital or current accruals models do not capture earnings management related to PPE.
Consistent with prior research, we use the following performanceadjusted modifiedJones
model as proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) to estimate total discretionary accruals:
TOTACC =
where:

/LAG_ASSETS +

0

( SALES  REC) +

1

PPE + LAG_ROA +

2

,

TOTACC = Total accruals defined as net income less cash from operations
scaled by lagged total assets;
LAG_ASSETS = Lagged total assets;
SALES = Change in sales scaled by lagged total assets;
REC = Change in accounts receivable, netted out prior to scaling above;
PPE = Net property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets;
and
LAG_ROA = Lagged return on assets.
5.2 Test Variable: Environmental Initiative
Following prior research, the residuals from the model above serve as our proxy for earnings
management.

We use both the absolute value of discretionary accruals (AB_DACC) and

incomeincreasing discretionary accruals (INC_DACC) in our tests. Because management may
15
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manipulate earnings by using incomeincreasing or incomedecreasing accruals, the magnitude
of discretion exercised is of interest, which is captured by AB_DACC. As our interest is also to
see if environmentally responsible firms report better financial performance through earnings
management, the use of INC_DACC would test management’s use of incomeincreasing
discretionary accruals.
Our environmental test variable (ENV) is measured three ways, with our primary
measure being the extent of environmental initiatives for each firm as reported by KLD. For
each of the five environmental initiatives rated by KLD, a firm is designated a binary variable (1
if an initiative is reported, 0 otherwise) to indicate if the firm is involved in that specific
environmental initiative.

We take the sum of these five different initiatives (ENV_IN) to

represent the extent of environmental initiatives undertaken by a firm. This approach is widely
used in prior research (e.g., Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hillman and Keim, 2001).11
Our second measure is a binary variable that captures whether a firm is reported to have
at least one environmental initiative (coded 1, and 0 otherwise) (ENV_YN). The purpose of this
measure is to test whether a single or multiple initiative matter. Since environmental initiatives
can vary in complexity and level of resources demanded, a single initiative alone may be
sufficient to attract market attention and influence corporate culture. This reasoning leads to our
third measure, which considers each of the five reported types of environmental initiatives to
capture some extent of how each different initiative is related to earnings management.
Accordingly, we include each of the five types of environmental initiatives in our model.
KLD describes the nature of each environmental initiative (KLD, 2006). The first initiative

Prior research equally ranks each component of the KLD environmental ratings because there is no theoretical
basis for a ranking (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Accordingly, we do not attempt to rank the environmental initiatives.
11
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relates to a company’s use and/or development of environmentally beneficial products or
services,

such

as

innovative

remediation

products

and

energy

efficient

processes

(PROD_SERV). The second applies to a company having notably strong pollution prevention
programs, such as emissions and toxicuse reductions (POLL_PREV). The third refers to a firm
which is a substantial user of recycled materials, or is a major factor of the recycling industry
itself (RECYCLE).

The fourth initiative indicates that a company has demonstrated a

commitment to climatefriendly practices in order to reduce its impact on climate change and
pollution; such measures include energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and clean
fuels (CLIMATE). Finally, the fifth environmental initiative in our data indicates a company’s
superior commitment to management systems, voluntary programs, and other environmentally
proactive activities (OTHER). In order to provide some idea and clarification of differences
between these initiatives, in the Appendix we provide examples of actual disclosures for each
initiative type made in corporate annual reports..
5.3 Control Variables
Based on the prior literature, we include variables determined to be significantly related to
measures of earnings management. We control for firm size (LN_MVE = natural log of the
market value of firm equity) but do not predict a direction because prior research reports mixed
results (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010). We include
leverage (LEV = total liabilities to total assets) as has been done in extant literature (Frankel et
al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010;
Choi et al., 2010) but do not predict its relation with discretionary accruals as firms may have
incentives to manage earnings with greater leverage in order to avoid debt covenant violations,
or they may have the incentive to refrain from earnings management due to the more stringent
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monitoring that accompanies greater debt financing. We include a firm’s markettobook ratio
(MKTBK = market value of firm equity divided by book value of firm equity) as this growth
measure has been found to be positively associated with discretionary accruals (Frankel et al.,
2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Choi
et al., 2010). We also include a loss indicator variable (LOSS = 1 if firm had an operating loss
for the financial year, and 0 otherwise) and expect it to be positively related to earnings
management because loss firms have incentives to report higher earnings (Frankel et al., 2002;
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2010).
We include operating cash flow (OCF = operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year
total assets) as firms with greater cash flows from operations have been found to be less likely to
manage earnings (Frankel et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al.,
2010). We also include a measure of the prior year’s total accruals (LAG_TOTACC = last
year’s total accruals scaled by beginning of year total assets) as extant literature has done so in
earnings management modeling to control for the variations in reversals of accruals over time
(Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2010).

We predict a negative

association with discretionary accruals based on the findings in the prior literature. Additionally,
we include auditor type (BIG4 = 1 if firm is audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, and 0
otherwise) because large audit firms provide greater audit quality and thus may lessen earnings
management (Frankel et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2003; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Choi et al., 2010).
Consistent with prior research, we include a merger or acquisition during the financial year
(MERGER = 1 if merger or acquisition occurred, and 0 otherwise) as a control but do not predict
a direction because of the mixed results in the literature (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al.,
2003). We also include a litigation risk variable (LITIGATION = 1 if the firm is in a high
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litigation risk industry identified by Francis et al. (1994) as SICs 28332836, 35703577, 3600
3674, 52005961, or 73707374, and 0 otherwise) as such risk has been associated with higher
discretionary accruals (Frankel et al., 2002; Ashbaugh et al., 2003). We expect LITIGATION to
be positively associated with earnings management.
We include a governance variable (ACEXP = 1 if the audit committee contains at least
one accounting expert, and 0 otherwise) because stronger governance mechanisms over financial
reporting may have a negative impact on a firm’s propensity to manage earnings (Bergstresser
and Philippon, 2006; Naiker and Sharma, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010).

We restrict the

governance measure to accounting experts on the audit committee because this is the primary
governance mechanism found to most significantly influence earnings management in recent
research (Naiker and Sharma, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). In supplementary tests, we consider
additional governance variables.
Lastly, we include year and industry indicator variables to control for variances due to
these factors, as other earnings management studies have done (Myers et al., 2003; Bergstresser
and Philippon, 2006). For industry classification, we use the Fama and French (2010) ten
industry portfolio. For efficient reference, the operational definition of our variables, their
expected association with our measure of earnings management, and their data sources are
summarized in Table 1.
<<< Insert Table 1 here >>>
6. Results
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our full sample and by firms with high and low
levels of earnings management based on the median split of the absolute value of discretionary
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accruals.12

With regard to our test variable, firms with greater environmental initiatives

(ENV_IN) have a lower tendency to manage earnings. The mean ENV_IN is significantly (p <
0.10) higher in the low DACC subsample relative to the high DACC subsample. This finding
provides preliminary support for our central hypothesis, which will be tested more robustly in the
multivariate analyses. Regarding our control variables, firms with higher DACC are less likely
to be audited by one of the Big 4 audit firms, as anticipated. They also tend to have less
operating cash flow, as expected. The descriptive data also show high DACC firms to be larger
as proxied by market value of equity, and to have greater litigation risk. These differences
suggest that characteristics of firms with higher levels of earnings management vary significantly
from firms with lower levels, which is consistent with prior research.
<<< Insert Table 2 here >>>
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for our dependent and control variables for
firms that have at least one environmental initiative (ENV_YN = 1) and those that do not have
any environmental initiatives (ENV_YN = 0).

We find that the average AB_DACC is

significantly lower in firms with at least one environmental initiative compared to firms without
an environmental initiative, thus providing preliminary support for our hypothesis. Two control
variables are significantly different; firms with at least one environmental initiative have
significantly lower leverage and are audited mostly by the Big 4 compared to firms without an
environmental initiative.
<<< Insert Table 3 here >>>
6.2 Multivariate Analyses

We winzorized our data at the first and 99th percentiles in order to control for outliers, and note that our
unwinzorized data yields consistent results.
12
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Table 4 reports Pearson and Spearman correlation matrices for the independent variables.
Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. The largest Pearson correlation is between
LEV and MKTBK, (r = 0.639) (Spearman correlation of 0.506), which is below the 0.80
multicollinearity threat threshold (Kennedy, 1992).

The highest of all the reported and

untabulated varianceinflationfactors (VIF) is 2.056, well below the threshold of 10 beyond
which multicollinearity may be a problem (Kennedy, 1992).
<<< Insert Table 4 here >>>
Table 5 presents the results for the regression of the absolute value of performance
adjusted modifiedJones discretionary accruals on the control variables and our primary test
variable, ENV_IN. The results for the control variables indicate that OCF and LAG_TOTACC
are negative and significantly associated with AB_DACC, as anticipated.

LEV is also

significantly negatively associated with AB_DACC, suggesting that more leveraged firms are
less likely to manage earnings via discretionary accruals, supporting the notion that more
stringent monitoring by creditors may help lessen management’s propensity to manipulate
earnings. We find LITIGATION and LOSS to be significantly positively related to AB_DACC,
as anticipated, signaling that firms that face greater litigation risk or firms that have incurred an
operating loss in the financial year are more likely to manage earnings through discretionary
accruals.
Most importantly, the results indicate a significant negative association between our test
variable, ENV_IN and AB_DACC.

Our hypothesis is therefore supported.

This finding

suggests that firms with greater environmental initiatives engage in less earnings management as
evidenced by lower levels of the absolute value of discretionary accruals. These results are
consistent with the two theoretical frameworks supporting our hypothesis in that, whether due to
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increased external monitoring by the market, innate corporate culture qualities, or both, firms
with greater environmental initiatives exhibit lower levels of earnings manipulation.
<<< Insert Table 5 here >>>
We also perform the above analysis with an alternate dependent variable measure in
Table 6. We isolate only those discretionary accruals that are incomeincreasing in order to
provide more insight. Since prior literature has established that firms with greater environmental
performance also appear to have greater financial performance, we perform our regression
analysis on only those discretionary accruals that increase reported income. As shown in Table
6, our results for incomeincreasing discretionary accruals as the dependent variable are
consistent with our analysis in Table 5. Our control variable results are also the same. Our
hypothesis is, therefore, further supported, suggesting that firms engaged in more environmental
initiatives are less likely to manage earnings through incomeincreasing accruals.
<<< Insert Table 6 here >>>
We also perform the above analyses using two additional measures of our test variable.
Tables 7 and 8 present our absolute value and incomeincreasing discretionary accrual analyses
employing an environmental initiative variable that captures whether a firm is reported by KLD
to have engaged in at least one environmental initiative (EI_YN). We find that EI_YN is
significant and negatively associated with both AB_DACC (Table 7) and INC_DACC (Table 8),
consistent with our findings in Tables 5 and 6. These findings suggest that a firm engaged in at
least one environmental initiative, regardless of what it may be, is negatively associated with the
extent to which earnings are manipulated.
<<< Insert Tables 7 and 8 here >>>
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In order to gain further insight on the specific types of initiatives as they relate to
earnings management, in Tables 9 and 10 we examine how each type of environmental initiative
is related to discretionary accruals. We find that two types of environmental initiatives are
significantly negatively associated with earnings management measured as the absolute value of
discretionary accruals: those related to a firm’s implementation of notably strong pollution
prevention programs, such as emissions and toxicuse reductions (POLL_PREV), and those that
indicate a firm’s commitment to climatefriendly practices aimed at reducing its impact on
climate change and pollution, such as energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy and
clean fuels (CLIMATE).

For incomeincreasing discretionary accruals, we find that only

POLL_PREV is negative and significant.13 These findings support the notion that firms engaged
in pollution prevention and/or climaterelated environmental initiatives are the least likely to
manage earnings. They also further support our hypothesis, adding clarity to those specific
initiatives that most impact a firm’s level of earnings manipulation.
<<< Insert Tables 9 and 10 here >>>
7. Additional Tests
7.1 Firm Size
We test the sensitivity of our primary results to client size, as larger firms are more visible and
have potentially more resources to engage in environmental initiatives. We partition our sample
into small and large firms based on median market value of equity (large firms > median). For
the large firm subsample, we obtain results consistent with our primary analyses; we find a
significant negative association between earnings management and environmental initiatives

This lack of significance for climaterelated initiatives may be attributed to the small sample size of firms with
incomeincreasing accruals and such initiatives (n = 35).
13
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(ENV_IN), with the same initiatives found to have the strongest negative association
(POLL_PREV and CLIMATE). On the contrary, the small firm subsample loses significance for
these variables of interest. Upon closer investigation, we find that large firms report over five
times the amount of environmental initiatives that small firms report in our sample (223 versus
44). This finding supports the aforementioned notion of greater resource availability for large
firms to participate in environmental initiatives, and the nonsignificant finding for small firms
may be due to the small number of such initiatives in the small firm sample. The disparity in
association between large and small firms may also be attributed to the greater visibility, and
therefore greater market and regulatory scrutiny, faced by large firms.
7.2 Environmentally Sensitive Industries
In order to examine the sensitivity of our results to environmentally sensitive industries, we
partition our sample into firms operating in and out of such industries, as defined by Cho et al.
(2006).14

As with the reasoning underlying our hypothesis, we anticipate environmentally

sensitive firms to be less likely to manage earnings due to greater external monitoring from
regulators and the market (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Rajgopal and
Venkatachalam, 1997; Becker et al., 1998; Mitra, 2002; Knyazeva, 2007; Yu, 2008) and/or due
to internal corporate culture being influenced by a greater sense of social responsibility (Etzioni,
1988; Van Dyne et al., 1994; Leonard, 1997; Sherman, 1997; Tichy et al., 1997; Maignan et al.,
1999; Fombrun et al., 2000; Lindgreen et al., 2009). On the other hand, a firm that participates
in environmental initiatives while operating in a nonenvironmentally sensitive industry may be
doing so on a more voluntary basis, perhaps driven by

a stronger corporate culture of

These industries are oil exploration, paper, chemical and allied products, pharmaceuticals, petroleum refining, and
metals industries.
14
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responsibility and ethical behavior. Thus, we expect environmental initiatives to be negatively
associated in both sets of firms. Our untabulated results of reestimating our primary regression
model for both sets of firms show that environmental initiative involvement (ENV_IN) is
negative and significantly (p < 0.10) associated with discretionary accruals for both sets of firms.
When we estimate our model that incorporates specific types of initiatives, we find that for firms
in environmentally sensitive industries, climaterelated initiatives (CLIMATE) appear to have
the strongest negative association with a firm’s level of earnings management (p < 0.10);
whereas for nonenvironmentally sensitive industry firms, pollution prevention initiatives
(POLL_PREV) have the greatest negative impact on earnings management (p < 0.01). Overall,
these results further support our primary analysis, as both industry groups appear to be less likely
to manage earnings when participating more heavily in environmental initiatives.
7.3 Yearly Analyses
We test the sensitivity of our primary results to the financial year examined. As previously
noted, our sample covers years 2004 to 2006. We conduct our regression analysis for each year
individually and find results consistent with our earlier results. In our primary tests, we excluded
an additional environmental initiative variable indicating ISO 14000 certification because KLD
began rating this measure in 2006. When we reestimate our equations for the entire sample and
for 2006 after including this additional environmental variable in our primary measure, ENV_IN
or ENV_YN, we find consistent results. Furthermore, when we include this ISO 14000 initiative
variable in our initiative type analyses, we find it is negatively related to firm levels of
discretionary accruals, but not significantly. This nonsignificant result could be due to the
relatively small number of firm observations with this type of initiative in our sample (n = 56) or
could signify the lack of influence ISO 14000 initiatives have on earnings management.
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7.4 Financial Performance
We theorized the plausibility that some high performing firms may engage in earnings
management practices to report higher earnings, but firms engaging in environmental initiatives
may be achieving their higher earnings performance through real economic gains flowing from
the benefits of environmental initiatives.

In order to test the sensitivity of our earnings

management findings to firms reporting relatively high or low financial performance measures,
we partition our sample based on the medians of two highlyanalyzed performance measures in
the literature: return on assets and earnings per share. The idea here is that if firms with
relatively higher performance show a positive association between environmental initiatives and
earnings management, then it can be argued that high performing firms may be partially
reporting higher earnings by engaging in earnings management related to environmental
initiatives (given the discretion management may have over the accounting treatment of
environmental initiatives).
For firms with high return on assets, we find results consistent with our primary analysis
with regard to the negative association previously found between discretionary accruals and
environmental initiatives and types of initiatives; however, one more initiative type shows
significance in this partition: initiatives related to a firm’s use and/or development of
environmentally beneficial products or services (PROD_SERV). This initiative type appears to
be significantly positively related to earnings management for high performing firms. This
finding potentially questions the true strength of financial performance for firms participating in
such initiatives, as it could be inflated due to manipulation of earnings by management. With
regard to firms with relatively lower return on assets, our findings are consistent with our
primary analyses, except that initiatives related to climate protection (CLIMATE) become an
26

insignificant indicator of earnings management for these firms. Our results are also consistent
when partitioning based on earnings per share, with the exception that for high earnings per share
firms, recycling initiatives (RECYCLE) additionally appear to be significantly negatively related
to earnings management, and as with low return on asset firms, low earnings per share firms do
not appear to have an association between earnings management and climate initiatives
(CLIMATE). Overall, these performance sensitivity tests support our hypothesis that firms with
greater environmental initiatives tend to be associated with a lower manipulation of earnings,
although there appears to be variation in the types of initiatives that drive this association.
To provide further support of our results above, we regress earnings per share (EPS) on
ENV_YN, signed discretionary accruals, interaction between ENV_YN and signed discretionary
accruals, and various control variables.15 We employ signed discretionary accruals rather than
the absolute measure because positive accruals are incomeincreasing and negative accruals are
incomedecreasing. Our interest is in understanding the incomeincreasing impact of accruals on
earnings in the presence of environmental initiatives.

We employ a dummy measure for

environmental initiatives (ENV_YN) for ease of interpreting the interaction term. The idea here
is to ascertain whether firms that engage in (1) incomeincreasing earnings management and (2)
environmental initiatives, report higher earnings.

Further, if firms engaging in earnings

management report higher earnings, then is this impact lower for firms that also engage in
environmental initiatives? This latter effect can be tested through our interaction term.
Results show that ENV_YN (β = 0.209, p < 0.05) and signed accruals (β = 0.656, p <
0.05) are positively associated with EPS.

These results suggest that firms engaging in

Control variables include firm size, leverage, company age, merger and acquisition, foreign operations, board
independence, duality, board size, board meetings, year dummy variables, and FamaFrench 10 industry dummy
variables.
15
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environmental initiatives report higher EPS, and those with positive accruals also report higher
EPS. However, the impact of earnings management (signed accruals) on EPS is not positive for
firms engaging in environmental initiatives because the interaction term, ENV_YN*signed
discretionary accruals, is negative and significant (β = 1.866, p < 0.05). This finding lends some
credence to our argument that firms employing incomeincreasing earnings management
techniques are not achieving higher earnings when they also engage in environmental initiatives.
Our results imply that firms engaging in environmental initiatives have good governance and
strong corporate culture because in such firms the opportunistic impact of earnings management
on reporting higher earnings is reduced.
7.5 Environmental Concerns
In addition to environmental initiative data, KLD reports and describes environmental concern
data (KLD, 2006).16 In order to test the sensitivity of our environmental initiative findings to the
inclusion of such concerns in our earnings management models, we include an environmental
concern variable that captures the sum of KLDreported environmental concerns for each firm,
similar to our derivation of our environmental initiative variable (ENV_IN) in our primary
analysis. Our test variable findings for environmental initiatives and types remain significantly
negative and consistent. Additionally, we find that environmental concerns are significantly
negatively related to discretionary accruals as well (p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with our
theoretical argument that firms facing greater regulatory and market scrutiny are less likely to

The six environmental concerns are firms: having large hazard waste liabilities or violations of waste management
regulations, having violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, being identified as one of the top
manufacturers of ozonedepleting chemicals, having high legal levels of toxic chemical emissions into the air and
water, being identified as a substantial producer of agricultural chemicals, having substantial direct or indirect
revenues from the sale or combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel products, and having involvement in any
other environmental controversy (KLD, 2006).
16
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manipulate earnings, as firms with known environmental concerns would undoubtedly face
greater monitoring from external sources.
7.6 Governance Index
We test the impact of corporate governance on our results because stronger governance has been
found to influence a firm’s ability to manage earnings (Dhaliwal et al., 2010) and propensity to
engage in environmental activities (Johnson and Greening, 1999; David et al., 2007). To capture
the overall effect of governance and to ensure our model is parsimonious, we derive a
governance index based on the independence and meeting frequency of the board of directors,
the size and expert considerations of the audit committee, and the dual nature of the CEO also
serving as chairman of the board. We select these governance factors because they have been
found the most significantly and commonly associated with earnings management (Beasley,
1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Sharma, 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Accordingly, we calculate an
indicator variable for each of these governance characteristics on a firm basis as follows: for
board independence, 1 if firm board independence percentage exceeds board independence
percentage median, and 0 otherwise; for board meetings, 1 if firm board meetings exceed board
meeting median, and 0 otherwise; for audit committee size, 1 if firm audit committee size equals
to or exceeds three, and 0 otherwise; for audit committee expert, 1 if firm has an accounting
expert on the audit committee, and 0 otherwise; and lastly, for duality, 1 if a firm’s CEO does not
also serve as chairman of the board; and 0 otherwise. We then derive our governance index as
the sum of each of these five indicator variables, whereby the higher the index, the stronger the
governance mechanisms in place. After incorporating this measure into the model, our test
variable of interest (ENV_IN) remains negative and significantly related to earnings
management (p < 0.01), supporting our primary analyses. Furthermore, our test by types of
29

initiatives yields consistent results. The governance index variable is significant (p < 0.10) and
upon further analyses we find that a firm whose CEO is not the chair of the board is driving this
result (p < 0.05), while the other governance variables are not significant.
8. Conclusion
The corporate world has observed an unprecedented increase in the attention paid to
environmental accountability from a range of stakeholders including Congress, regulators, the
market, and society at large. Recent authoritative guidelines in accounting, such as the SEC’s
release describing the need to increase environmental disclosure transparency (SEC, 2010),
highlight the importance of environmental considerations in accounting research. This study
seeks to add insight to this developing paradigm by examining the association between
environmental initiatives and earnings management.
We anticipate firms with environmental initiatives will exhibit lower levels of earnings
management based on two theoretical frameworks. The first is an external monitoring theory
that suggests the greater attention, monitoring and scrutiny of environmentallyactive firms from
regulators, capital market participants and society will lessen management’s motives to
artificially manipulate earnings. This theory is supported by extant research that documents
higher financial reporting quality for firms subject to greater external monitoring (Defond and
Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow et al., 1996; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 1997; Becker et al., 1998;
Mitra, 2002; Knayazvena, 2007; Yu, 2008).
The second framework we rely on is an internal corporate culture theory. This theory
posits firms with environmental initiatives have a stronger corporate culture because
commitment to environmental responsibility stems from values and belief systems that are
ethical and moral and discourage pursuit of selfinterest behavior. Such a culture is supported by
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extant literature in nonaccounting contexts (Etzioni, 1988; Tichy et al., 1997; Sherman, 1997;
Turban and Greening, 1997; Leonard, 1997; Maignan et al., 1999; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001;
VanDyne et al., 1994; Fombrum et al., 2000) and may be associated with lower earnings
management. Together, these two theoretical frameworks support our directional hypothesis that
predicts an inverse association between environmental initiatives and earnings management.
Our results support this hypothesis.

We consistently find a significant negative

association between environmental initiatives and earnings management measured using the
performanceadjusted modifiedJones model (Kothari et al., 2005). Our results hold for both
absolute value and incomeincreasing total discretionary accruals. We further find that this
association is strongest for environmental initiatives related to pollution prevention and climate
protection efforts. Future research with more specific data using both empirical archival and
survey methods could provide greater interpretation of these initiative type results. Nevertheless,
our results infer that firms engaged in environmental initiatives appear to be less likely to
manage earnings via discretionary accruals.
Given that firms with greater environmental initiatives tend to report stronger financial
results (Bragdon and Marlin, 1972; Spicer, 1978; Douglas and Judge, 1995; Semenova and
Hassel, 2008; Guenster et al., 2011), and also given that managers in general have been shown to
manipulate earnings via discretionary accruals in order to appear stronger financially
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Payne and Robb, 2000; Dechow et al., 2000; Matsumoto, 2002;
Das and Zhang, 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2003; Lin et al., 2008), our finding of lower
earnings management for environmentallyresponsible firms supports the notion that the strong
financial performance documented for such firms may not be a result of earnings management to
the extent the evidence suggests in this study. Our results imply the relatively better financial
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performance of environmentally responsible firms reported in prior literature is likely due to real
economic gains, as such firms seem to have developed better relationships with stakeholders,
consumers, and society, which in turn, creates loyalty and generates revenues (e.g., Fry et al.,
1982; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Lev et al., 2010). Accordingly, we believe that environmentally
responsible firms have fewer incentives to manipulate earnings to report better performance.
Additionally, our results provide further insight to recent studies that have more broadly
examined earnings management in the context of various CSR initiatives (Trebucq and Russ,
2005; Petrovitis, 2006; Chih et al., 2008; Prior et al., 2008; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011; Kim
et al., 2012). Given that these studies provide conflicting results, this insight is valuable with
specific regard to environmental initiatives. We also note that our finding of lower earnings
management via discretionary accruals for firms with environmental initiatives is consistent with
the most recent evidence in this area which documents a negative association between CSR
performance and earnings management (Kim et al., 2012).
Our results have important implications for practice.

Since firms that engage in

environmental initiatives also engage in less earnings management potentially due to stronger
internal corporate culture, directors and managers may want to evaluate participation in such
initiatives as a means of boosting employee morale and promoting more ethical business
behavior. Regulators may want to consider policy development that evaluates and encourages
firm participation in environmental initiatives given its association with less earnings
management as well. And of course, employees and investors alike may take a greater interest in
firm environmental accountability measures given their association with more conservative
financial reporting, which may underscore an overall more ethical corporate tone.
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Some potential limitations of our study provide opportunities for future research. First, a
closer examination of the factors driving the lower discretionary accruals for environmentally
responsible firms could be examined. More specifically, is this association attributable to one or
both of our two proposed theories (external monitoring and internal corporate culture), or some
other theory yet to be explored? We are unable to identify the motives for firm engagement in
environmental initiatives from our archival data but encourage future researchers to explore such
issues using other methods such as surveys and interviews. Second, while we use discretionary
accruals as a proxy for earnings management, it has limitations, and future studies could examine
other proxies to test the sensitivity and generalizability of our results. Some of these proxies
include the likelihood of financial restatement, fraud, the propensity to meet or beat analyst
forecasts, and earnings conservatism. Third, our environmental initiative data does not provide
information on the likely success of the initiative, nor does it capture the extent of the financial
investment related to a particular initiative. Such information, however, would allow for more
thorough examination of these initiatives in general, and as they relate to earnings management.
For example, some initiatives may be more demanding of resources, more costly to implement,
and more questionable in measurability of success. These types of initiatives could incentivize
management to justify the investment in these initiatives as they face pressure to meet market
expectations. Fourth, we do not specifically examine the incentives facing management to
engage in environmental initiatives and how these affect the association between initiatives and
discretionary accruals.

For example, we could gain more insight into the environmental

initiative behavior of firms seeking to reduce the cost of capital, or obtain new financing, or
those seeking some federal or state concessions. Fifth, our period of study is prior to the
economic crisis in 2008 to 2009, which may have altered in the implications of environmental
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initiatives since this time. Future research may examine the change in environmental initiatives
prior to, during, and following the crisis. Sixth, we focus on U.S. firms to examine our research
question, but an international analysis of this association may yield interesting insight into
differences amongst countries in our evermore globalized business world. Lastly, environmental
initiatives can be examined from the perspectives of a variety of interested stakeholders, such as
directors, managers, employees, auditors, and investors. This opens avenues for advancing our
limited knowledge of the increasingly important issue of environmental accountability facing
corporations and society. We hope that our initial evidence will encourage debate, discussions,
and more research on this important issue.
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TABLE 1
Variable Definitions

Variable Name

Expecte
d Sign

Panel A: Dependent Variables
AB_DACC

Absolute value of firm performanceadjusted modifiedJones model
discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005).
Incomeincreasing firm performanceadjusted modifiedJones model
discretionary accruals (Kothari et al. 2005).

INC_DACC
Panel B: Test Variables
ENV_IN



ENV_YN



Panel B: Control Variables
LN_MVE
LEV
MKTBK
LOSS
OCF
LAG_TOTACC

?
?
+
+



BIG4
MERGER


?

LITIGATION

+

ACEXP



YEAR FIXED EFFECTS
INDUSTRY

Variable Measurement

Sum of types of environmental initiatives for a firm in a given year as
reported by KLD Analytics.
1 if a firm engages in at least one environmental initiative as reported by
KLD Analytics, and 0 otherwise.
Natural log of the market value of firm equity (Compustat).
Total debt to total assets (Compustat).
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity (Compustat).
1 if firms reports a loss in the fiscal year, and 0 otherwise (Compustat).
Operating cash flow scaled by beginning of year total assets (Compustat).
Last year’s total accruals scaled by beginning of year total assets
(Compustat).
1 if firm is audited by a Big 4, and 0 otherwise (Compustat).
1 if firm was involved in a merger or acquisition in the current year, and 0
otherwise (Compustat).
1 if the firm is in a high litigation risk industry identified by Francis et al.
(1994) as SIC’s 28332836, 35703577, 36003674, 52005961, 7370
7374, and 0 otherwise. (Compustat).
1 if audit committee contains at least one accounting expert, and 0
otherwise (Corporate Library and proxy statements).
Year dummies.
Ten portfolio industry dummy variables as defined by Fama and French
(2010).

41

This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this
version to appear here http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/. Emerald does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample and for Firms with High and Low Discretionary Accruals
Full Sample
High Discretionary Accrual Firms
Low Discretionary Accruals Firms
(n = 2,095)
(n = 1,048 )
(n = 1,047 )
Variable
Mean
Median
SD
Mean
Median
SD
Mean
Median
SD
LN_MVE
21.39
21.21
1.36
21.44
21.27
1.35
21.34
21.15
1.36
LEV
0.56
0.55
0.23
0.57
0.56
0.23
0.55
0.54
0.23
MKTBK
1.33
1.04
1.14
1.31
1.00
1.16
1.36
1.09
1.11
LOSS
0.11
0.00
0.32
0.12
0.00
0.32
0.11
0.00
0.31
OCF
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.11
0.99
0.86
LAG_TOTACC
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
BIG4
0.96
1.00
0.20
0.95
1.00
0.22
0.96
1.00
0.19
MERGER
0.06
0.00
0.24
0.07
0.00
0.25
0.05
0.00
0.22
LITIGATION
0.21
0.00
0.41
0.25
0.00
0.43
0.19
0.00
0.37
ACEXP
0.71
1.00
0.46
0.71
1.00
0.46
0.71
1.00
0.45
ENV_IN
0.13
0.00
0.40
0.11
0.00
0.38
0.14
0.00
0.42
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
b
Test results are identical when we use nonparametric tests.
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Test of
Differencesb
tstatistic
1.78*
1.44
1.04
0.94
2.03**
0.21
1.71**
1.55
4.63***
0.20
1.39*

Table 3
Descriptive Statistics for Firms With and Without Environmental Initiatives (EI)
Firms With EI
Firms Without EI
Test of
(n = 248)
(n = 1,847)
Differencesb
Variable
Mean
Median
SD
Mean
Median
SD
tstatistic
AB_DACC
0.06
0.04
0.09
0.08
0.04
0.10
2.811***
LN_MVE
21.41
21.21
1.35
21.39
21.21
1.35
0.256
LEV
0.51
0.52
0.23
0.57
0.56
0.23
3.619***
MKTBK
1.43
1.11
1.25
1.33
1.03
1.14
1.344
LOSS
0.12
0.00
0.31
0.11
0.00
0.32
0.216
OCF
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.825
LAG_TOTACC
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.926
BIG4
0.98
1.00
0.13
0.95
1.00
0.21
2.219**
MERGER
0.05
0.00
0.21
0.06
0.00
0.24
0.817
LITIGATION
0.17
0.00
0.38
0.21
0.00
0.41
1.381
ACEXP
0.67
1.00
0.47
0.71
1.00
0.45
1.344
ENV_IN
1.09
1.00
0.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
84.49***
***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
b
Test results are identical when we use nonparametric tests.

43

This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this
version to appear here http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/. Emerald does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Table 4
Correlations: Pearson (Spearman) Correlations are Presented in the Upper (Lower) Diagonala
DACC
DACC
LN_MVE
LEV

LN_MV
E
0.032

0.051
0.026
0.037

0.104

LEV

0.003
0.097

MKTBK

LOSS

OCF

LAG_TOTACC

BIG4

MERGER

LITIGATION

0.018

0.036

0.145

0.057

0.007

0.027

0.164

0.166
0.506

0.205
0.036

0.028
0.020

0.004
0.037

0.015
0.026

0.013
0.010

0.030
0.009

0.002

0.016

0.015

0.008
0.004
0.024

0.026
0.047
0.005
0.043

0.027
0.141
0.014
0.026
0.021


0.006
0.006
0.015
0.639
0.026
LOSS
0.212
0.033
0.034
0.055
0.033
0.022
OCF
0.018
0.003
0.020
0.044
0.147
0.021
LAG_TOTACC
0.018
0.038
0.016
0.021
0.064
0.028
BIG4
0.011
0.024
0.005
0.008
0.011
0.059
0.041
MERGER
0.012
0.011
0.042
0.026
0.041
0.033
0.117

LITIGATION
0.019
0.003
0.027
0.059
0.027
0.002
0.002
ACEXP
0.004
0.022
0.019
0.003
0.022
0013
0.062

ENV_IN
0.014
0.048
0.005 0.041
0.081
0.084
a
Correlations significant at the twotailed 0.05 level are in bold figures. See Table 1 for variable definitions.
MKTBK

0.105

0.043
0.026

0.021

0.014

0.011

0.009

0.039

0.046

0.034
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ACEXP

ENV_IN

0.010

0.058

0.006
0.024
0.008

0.007
0.080
0.028

0.003
0.030
0.001
0.014
0.011
0.009

0.007
0.016
0.018
0.026
0.045
0.030
0.029

0.041

Table 5
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiatives
AB_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_IN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }

Variable

Expected
Sign

Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.047

1.308

LN_MVE

?

0.002

1.331

LEV

?

0.023

2.077**

MKTBK

+

0.002

0.797

LOSS

+

0.012

1.719**

OCF



0.102

4.792***

LAG_TOTACC



5.181

1.502*

BIG4



0.000

0.026

MERGER

?

0.006

0.664

LITIGATION

+

0.021

3.284***

ACEXP



0.000

0.041

ENV_IN



0.012

2.224**

YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

2,095

Adjusted R2/Fvalue

0.10

VIF Range

11.091***

1.021 – 1.536

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See Table
1 for variable definitions.
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Table 6
Regression of IncomeIncreasing Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiatives
INC_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_IN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }

Variable

Expected
Sign

Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.061

0.993

LN_MVE

?

0.002

0.654

LEV

?

0.033

1.719*

MKTBK

+

0.003

0.732

LOSS

+

0.022

1.861**

OCF



0.195

5.406***

LAG_TOTACC



20.606

3.822***

BIG4



0.004

0.246

MERGER

?

0.017

1.041

LITIGATION

+

0.029

2.600***

ACEXP



0.003

0.377

ENV_IN



0.015

1.497*

YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

927

Adjusted R2/Fvalue

0.13

VIF Range

7.355***

1.038 – 1.502

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See
Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 7
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiative Indicator
AB_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_YN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }

Variable

Expected
Sign

Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.034

0.940

LN_MVE

?

0.002

1.328

LEV

?

0.023

2.089**

MKTBK

+

0.002

0.814

LOSS

+

0.012

1.699**

OCF



0.101

4.785***

LAG_TOTACC



5.153

1.494*

BIG4



0.000

0.039

MERGER

?

0.006

0.727

LITIGATION

+

0.021

3.316***

ACEXP



0.000

0.067

ENV_YN



0.016

2.332***

YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

2,095

Adjusted R2/Fvalue

0.10

VIF Range

11.116***

1.020 – 1.537

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See
Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Table 8
Regression of IncomeIncreasing Discretionary Accruals on Environmental Initiative Indicator
INC_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, ENV_YN, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }

Variable

Expected
Sign

Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.060

0.976

LN_MVE

?

0.002

0.658

LEV

?

0.033

1.728*

MKTBK

+

0.003

0.762

LOSS

+

0.021

1.829**

OCF



0.194

5.413***

LAG_TOTACC



20.625

3.826***

BIG4



0.005

0.321

MERGER

?

0.017

1.023

LITIGATION

+

0.029

2.666***

ACEXP



0.003

0.370

ENV_YN



0.019

1.589*

YEAR FIXED EFFECTS

yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

927

Adjusted R2/Fvalue

0.13

VIF Range

7.370***

1.038 – 1.502

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See
Table 1 for variable definitions..
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Table 9
Regression of Absolute Value of Discretionary Accruals on Types of Environmental Initiatives
AB_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, PROD_SERV, POLL_PREV, RECYCLE, CLIMATE,
OTHER, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }
Expected
Sign

Variable
Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.046

1.279

LN_MVE

?

0.002

1.325

LEV

?

0.023

2.082**

MKTBK

+

0.002

0.817

LOSS

+

0.012

1.741**

OCF



0.100

4.728***

LAG_TOTACC



4.964

1.438*

BIG4



0.000

0.015

MERGER

?

0.006

0.694

LITIGATION

+

0.020

3.219***

ACEXP



0.000

0.044

PROD_SERV



0.010

0.814

POLL_PREV



0.033

2.256**

RECYCLE



0.009

0.522

CLIMATE



0.019

1.635**

OTHER
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS



0.001

0.042
yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

2,095

Adjusted R /Fvalue

0.10

2

VIF Range

9.627***

1.022 – 1.538

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See
Table 1 for variable definitions.

49

This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this
version to appear here http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/. Emerald does
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted
elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Table 10
Regression of IncomeIncreasing Discretionary Accruals on Types of Environmental Initiatives
INC_DACC =

f { LN_MVE, LEV, MKTBK, LOSS, OCF, LAG_TOTACC, BIG4, MERGER,
LITIGATION, ACEXP, PROD_SERV, POLL_PREV, RECYCLE, CLIMATE,
OTHER, YEAR FIXED EFFECTS, INDUSTRY }
Expected
Sign

Variable
Intercept

Estimate

tstatistic

0.058

0.949

LN_MVE

?

0.002

0.648

LEV

?

0.034

1.775*

MKTBK

+

0.003

0.730

LOSS

+

0.021

1.817**

OCF



0.188

5.218***

LAG_TOTACC



20.179

3.740***

BIG4



0.006

0.365

MERGER

?

0.018

1.062

LITIGATION

+

0.027

2.415***

ACEXP



0.004

0.459

PROD_SERV



0.022

0.970

POLL_PREV



0.042

1.673**

RECYCLE



0.006

0.178

CLIMATE



0.025

1.146

OTHER
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS



0.003

0.094
yes

INDUSTRY

yes

Observations

927

Adjusted R /Fvalue

0.13

2

VIF Range

6.390***

1.039 – 1.507

***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. Onetailed tests used for a directional
prediction, and twotailed otherwise. The tstatistics are based on White’s (1980) adjusted standard errors. See
Table 1 for variable definitions.
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Initiative Type
Environmental Products
and Services
(PROD_SERV)

Company
Waters
Corporation

Pollution Prevention
(POLL_PREV)

3M Company

Recycling Initiatives
(RECYCLE)

Trex Company,
Inc.

Climate Protection
(CLIMATE)

FPL Group, Inc.

Other Environmentally
Proactive Initiatives
(OTHER)

The Dow
Chemical
Company

Appendix: Examples of Environmental Initiatives
Example
The Company’s Waters instruments (LC and MS) are utilized in this broad range of industries to detect, identify,
monitor and measure the chemical, physical and biological composition of materials as well as to purify a full range
of compounds. These instruments are used in drug discovery and development, including clinical trial testing, the
analysis of proteins in disease processes (known as “proteomics”), food safety analysis and environmental testing
(Waters Corporation 2006).
Capital expenditures for environmental purposes have included pollution control devices — such as wastewater
treatment plant improvements, scrubbers, containment structures, solvent recovery units and thermal oxidizers — at
new and existing facilities constructed or upgraded in the normal course of business. Consistent with the Company’s
policies stressing environmental responsibility, capital expenditures… for known projects are presently expected to be
about $20 million over the next two years for new or expanded programs to build facilities or modify manufacturing
processes to minimize waste and reduce emissions (3M Company 2006).
Through capital investments and process engineering, we continuously seek to lower the allin cost to manufacture
Trex products. Investments in plastic recycling capabilities will allow us to expand our ability to use a wider breadth
of waste streams and as a result lower our raw material costs (Trex Company, Inc. 2006).
As a participant in President Bush's Climate Leader Program to reduce greenhouse gas intensity in the United States
by 18% by 2012, FPL Group has inventoried its greenhouse gas emission rates and has committed to a 2008 reduction
target of 18% below a 2001 baseline emission rate measured in pounds per megawatthour. FPL Group believes that
the planned operation of its generating portfolio, along with its current efficiency initiatives, greenhouse gas
management efforts and increased use of renewable energy, will allow it to achieve this target. In addition, FPL
Group has joined the U.S. Climate Action Partnership, an alliance made up of a diverse group of U.S.based
businesses and environmental organizations, which in early 2007 issued a set of principles and recommendations to
address global climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions (FPL Group, Inc. 2006).
Dow is committed to worldclass environmental, health and safety ("EH&S") performance, as demonstrated by a
longstanding commitment to Responsible Care®, the significant progress made by the Company over a 10year
period toward Dow's EH&S Goals for 2005, and the development of Dow's new 2015 Sustainability Goals. In 2005,
Dow developed its next generation of 10year goals that will provide continuity to the first set of goals, while also
addressing a broader set of challenges. The 2015 Sustainability Goals will set the standard for sustainability in the
chemical industry by focusing on improvements in Dow's local corporate citizenship and product stewardship, and by
actively pursuing methods to reduce the Company's environmental impact (The Dow Chemical Company 2006).

51

This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted
for this version to appear here http://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/facpubs/.
Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from
Emerald Group Publishing Limited

